Who Are the Real Victims of Cild Pornography - After United States v. Sherman, the Answer Is Becoming Clear by Manos, Elias
Volume 10 Issue 2 Article 4 
2003 
Who Are the Real Victims of Cild Pornography - After United 
States v. Sherman, the Answer Is Becoming Clear 
Elias Manos 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Elias Manos, Who Are the Real Victims of Cild Pornography - After United States v. Sherman, the Answer 
Is Becoming Clear, 10 Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports L.J. 327 (2003). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol10/iss2/4 
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal by an authorized 
editor of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
Casenotes
WHO ARE THE REAL VICTIMS OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY?
AFTER UNITED STATES V SHERMAN, THE
ANSWER IS BECOMING CLEAR
I. INTRODUCTION
With the absence of any comprehensive federal sentencing
guidelines prior to 1984, "unwarranted disparity" and "uncertainty"
regarding the length of an offender's imprisonment characterized
sentencing in federal court.' This disparity in sentencing was ap-
parent both among and within different districts and circuits. 2 As a
result, in 1984 Congress created the United States Sentencing Com-
mission to "promulgate and distribute to all courts of the United
States[,] ... guidelines ... for use of a sentencing court in deter-
mining the sentence to be imposed in a criminal case .... "3 Thus,
the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Sentencing Guidelines")
went into effect in 1987 to "provid[e] certainty and fairness in sen-
tencing" and to "reduc[e] unwarranted sentence disparities. '4
One characteristic of the Sentencing Guidelines is "grouping,"
which applies in certain cases for sentencing purposes. 5 For exam-
ple, a person convicted of multiple counts of a crime may receive
an increased sentence unless the counts are grouped for sentencing
purposes because they involve the same victim and harm.6 If shown
that the multiple counts involve the same primary victim, then the
counts may be grouped accordingly to prevent the sentence from
increasing.7 Therefore, when determining if multiple-count convic-
tions of related offenses should be grouped for sentencing pur-
I. See S. REP. No. 98-473, at 49 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3220,
3232 (describing average federal sentence for bank robbery as eleven years com-
pared to Northern District of Illinois's sentence of half that).
2. See id. at 41 (describing varying results of Second Circuit study on judges'
proposed sentences under identical circumstances as "astounding").
3. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2000).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 994(f).
5. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.2 (2002) (describing cir-
cumstances in which multiple counts should be grouped as one).
6. See id.; see also United States Sentencing Commission, An Overview of the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines (2002) (noting multiple counts result in combined offense
level), available at http://www.ussc.gov/general/GLOVRWB.PDF.
7. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.2 cmt. 3 (listing examples
of grouping which can prevent sentence from inappropriate increase).
(327)
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poses, courts must first identify the primary victim of the particular
crime.8 If the court cannot identify clearly the primary victim of
the multiple counts, the primary victim is deemed to be society in
general. 9
Circuit courts are split in determining the primary victim in
crimes involving possessing, receiving, transporting, distributing,
shipping, and reproducing child pornography under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2252 and 2252A.' This Note examines the Seventh Circuit's de-
cision in United States v. Sherman,I' which held that children por-
trayed in pornography are the direct victims of such offenses for
sentencing purposes. 12 Before Sherman, the Third, Fifth, Sixth,
8. See id. § 3D1.2 cmt. 2 (providing there is generally "one person who is di-
rectly and most seriously affected by the offense and is therefore identifiable as the
victim").
9. See id. (listing drug and immigration offenses as examples of how society in
general is primary victim).
10. See United States v. Sherman, 268 F.3d 539, 547 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding
child depicted as primary victim of possessing, receiving, and distributing child
pornography); United States v. Tillmon, 195 F.3d 640, 645 (11th Cir. 1999) (per
curiam) (holding primary victim of transporting child pornography was child por-
trayed); United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926, 930 (5th Cir. 1998) (determining
primary victim of receiving child pornography to be child portrayed); United
States v. Hibbler, 159 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1998) (rtling child portrayed as pri-
mary victim of possessing and distributing child pornography); United States v.
Boos, 127 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding primary victim of distributing
child pornography was child depicted); United States v. Ketcham, 80 F.3d 789, 793
(3d Cir. 1996) (finding child portrayed as primary victim of receiving, transport-
ing, distributing, and recording child pornography); United States v. Rugh, 968
F.2d 750, 756 (8th Cir. 1992) (determining primary victim of receiving child por-
nography to be child depicted). But see United States v. Toler, 901 F.2d 399, 403
(4th Cir. 1990) (holding primary victim of transporting child pornography was
society in general). Sections 2252 and 2252A are very similar statutes, and thus
courts have made no distinction between them when determining the primary vic-
tims tinder these statutes. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2252A (2000). Section 2252
criminalizes possessing, receiving, transporting, distributing, and shipping any vis-
ual depiction that was produced using a minor engaged in sexually explicit activity.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2252. Section 2252A criminalizes possessing, receiving, transport-
ing, distributing, shipping, and reproducing any child pornography. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A. The definition of child pornography for purposes of § 2252A includes
any visual depiction that "appears to be" or "conveys the impression" of a minor
engaged in sexually explicit activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B)-(D) (2000).
Therefore, § 2252A includes computer-generated child pornography as well as sex-
ually explicit depictions of adults made to look like children, and § 2252 does not.
See id. For the full text of § 2256(8) and its definition of child pornography, see
infra note 150 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court, however, recently held that § 2256(8)(B) and
§ 2256(8) (D) were unconstitutionally overbroad because the definitions included
speech, which was neither actual child pornography nor obscene, thus restricting
lawful speech in violation of the First Amendment. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002).
11. 268 F.3d 539 (7th Cir. 2001).
12. See id. at 547-48.
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Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits also found that the children
portrayed in pornography are the primary victims of such offenses,
while the Fourth Circuit found that the primary victim is society in
general. 13
Section II of this Note lays out the specific facts surrounding
the Sherman case.' 4 Section III discusses the Sentencing Guidelines
and the split in these seven judicial decisions leading up to Sher-
man.15 Section IV presents the majority and dissenting views in the
Sherman opinion.1 6 Section V analyzes the reasoning of these ma-
jority and dissenting opinions.1 7 Finally, Section VI explores the
likely impact of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Sherman and the
dissent's possible ramifications.' 8
II. FACTS
In September of 1988, George Sherman mailed a videotape of
minors engaged in sexually explicit activity to an individual in Onta-
rio, Canada, with whom he had been corresponding.' 9 A letter ac-
companied the videotape stating: "Here's your tape. Hope you
enjoy it[; w]here's the TAPE that you are sending me???" 20 Cana-
dian postal inspectors seized the letter and the tape, the subjects of
Count One of the indictment against Sherman, charging him with
knowingly mailing, transporting, and shipping child pornography
in interstate or foreign commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C.
13. See Tillmon, 195 F.3d at 645 (finding primary victim of transporting child
pornography was child portrayed); Norris, 159 F.3d at 930 (determining primary
victim of receiving child pornography to be child portrayed); Hibbler, 159 F.3d at
237 (ruling child portrayed as primary victim of possessing and distributing child
pornography); Boos, 127 F.3d at 1213 (holding primary victim of distributing child
pornography was child depicted); Ketcham, 80 F.3d at 793 (finding child portrayed
as primary victim of receiving, transporting, distributing, and recording child por-
nography); Rugh, 968 F.2d at 756 (determining primary victim of receiving child
pornography to be child depicted); Toler, 901 F.2d at 403 (holding primary victim
of transporting child pornography was society in general).
14. For a discussion of the relevant facts in Sherman, see infra notes 19-32 and
accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the Sentencing Guidelines and the split in judicial
authority leading up to Sherman, see infra notes 33-130 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the majority and dissenting opinions in Sherman, see
infra notes 131-59 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of criticisms of the Sherman court's analysis, see infra
notes 160-93 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the likely impact of the Sherman court's decision, see
infra notes 194-204 and accompanying text.
19. See United States v. Sherman, 268 F.3d 539, 540 (7th Cir. 2001). Approxi-
mately seventy percent of the six-hour videotape depicted minors involved in "sex-
ually explicit activity." See id.
20. Id.
3
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§ 2252A(a) (1).21 Canadian postal inspectors further alerted the
United States Customs Service, which conducted a search of Sher-
man's Chicago apartment in 1998 and recovered eight more video-
tapes containing "sexually explicit" images of children. 22 This
seizure eventually resulted in Count Two of the indictment against
Sherman, charging him with knowingly possessing pornographic
materials that had been mailed, transported, and shipped in inter-
state or foreign commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a) (5) (B). 23
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), also apprised of
Sherman's conduct, asked the United States Postal Service to inves-
tigate Sherman's involvement in child pornography.2 4 At the FBI's
request, an agent of the Postal Inspection Service mailed a letter to
Sherman as being from "Lou and Ann," the fictitious owners of an
adult film business, "Foreign Films Etcetera," specializing in visual
materials "very much outside the norm." 25 The postal agent's con-
tact initiated a series of letters back and forth until Sherman re-
ceived a brochure from the fictitious business.2 6 From the
descriptions given in the brochure, Sherman ordered a video con-
taining sexually explicit activity of two boys between the ages of
twelve and fifteen and a photo set of boys between the ages of eight
and fifteen engaged in sexually explicit activity.27 Sherman also fil-
led out a survey marking as his sexual interests "chickenhawk" and
"incest," and writing "young underage" on a blank line for special
requests. 28 Sherman further indicated an interest in buying and
trading materials, and he was warned expressly by the fictitious
21. See id. at 540-41 (describing search eventually leading to Count One of
indictment against Sherman).
22. See id. at 541 (identifying evidence recovered by United States
authorities).
23. See id.
24. See Sherman, 268 F.3d at 541. The origin of the FBI's suspicion of Sher-
man's activity is unknown except that it was independent of the investigations by
either the United States Customs Service or Canadian officials. See id.
25. See id. (describing postal agent's introduction to Sherman).
26. See id.
27. See id. The videotape Sherman ordered was titled "Boys-3," and the photo
set was titled "Chicken for Hire." See id.
28. See id. According to the court, "chickenhawk" is "a category of pornogra-
phy involving older adult males who have a sexual interest in very young or under-
age males. The young or underage males are referred to as 'chickens,' while the
older men are 'hawks.'" Id. n.1; see also Steve Baldwin, Child Molestation and the
Homosexual Movement, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 267, 277 (2002) (noting boys are
known as "chickens" and customers as "chickenhawks").
[Vol. 10: p. 327
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"Lou and Ann" that some of the material that they sold was "very
illegal." 29
In March 1999, the postal agent delivered the materials that
Sherman ordered, at which time Sherman signed a receipt and ac-
cepted the package containing the materials.30 When authorities
later conducted a search of Sherman's apartment, they found the
videotape and the photo set that Sherman had ordered, a duplicate
that Sherman had made of the videotape, and numerous other
videotapes containing images of underage males engaged in sexu-
ally explicit activity. 31 As a result, the authorities arrested Sherman,
leading to Count Three of the indictment, charging him with know-
ingly receiving child pornography that had been mailed, shipped,
and transported in interstate or foreign commerce in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a) (2) (A).3 2
III. BACKGROUND
A. The United States Sentencing Guidelines
The Sentencing Guidelines provide a base offense level for
each particular crime. 33 This level can increase or decrease with
the presence of specific characteristics of the offense or because of
circumstances related to the particular defendant. 34 This base of-
29. See Sherman, 268 F.3d at 541.
30. See id. (describing exchange between defendant and agent leading to
search of Sherman's apartment).
31. See id. The opened photo set was found under the cushion of Sherman's
living room chair, and the videotape and its duplicate were found in Sherman's
oven. See id.
32. See id. Sherman pleaded guilty to Count Three and stipulated to the con-
duct in Counts One and Two. See id. at 541-42.
33. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2002); see also United States
Sentencing Commission, supra note 6. The Sentencing Guidelines provide forty-
three base offense levels depending on the seriousness of the crime. See U.S. SEN-
TFENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2002); see also United States Sentencing Commis-
sion, supra note 6. The more serious the crime committed, the higher the base
offense level. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2002); see also United
States Sentencing Commission, supra note 6.
34. See United States Sentencing Commission, supra note 6. The base level for
robbery, for example, can increase from five to seven levels depending on whether
a gun was used and whether it was displayed or discharged during the robbery. See
id. Similarly, the base level for crimes involving possessing, receiving, transporting,
distributing, or shipping child pornography will increase by four levels "if the of-
fense involved material that portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct or other de-
pictions of violence." United States v. Walton, 255 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 2001)
(quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(3)). Furthermore, the
following factors specific to the individual defendant are considered: age, educa-
tion, vocational skills, mental and emotional condition, physical condition, previ-
ous employment record, family and community ties, role in the offense, criminal
5
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fense level also can be affected if the defendant has been convicted
of multiple counts of an offense.3 5 Further, this level can be modi-
fied depending on whether the offender accepts responsibility for
the crime.3 6 Moreover, each offender is assigned a criminal history
category number between one and six based on his or her past
criminal record.3 7 The final determination of the offense level cor-
responds to the criminal history category on a sentencing chart that
provides a range of possible sentences a judge may impose at his or
her discretion.""
As previously noted, multiple counts can increase the base of-
fense level and thus the severity of the sentence. 39 The defendant
may prevent this multi-count enhancement only when the multiple
counts can be grouped as one under section 3D1.2 of the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines. 4" Section 3D1.2 provides that multiple "counts in-
volving substantially the same harm shall be grouped together into
a single Group." 4 1 Counts are considered substantially the same
when they "involve the same victim and two or more acts or transac-
tions connected by a common criminal objective or constituting
part of a common scheme or plan."4 2 The commentary to this
history, and degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood. See 28
U.S.C. § 994(d) (2000).
35. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.4 (describing how multi-
ple counts can increase base offense level).
36. See United States Sentencing Commission, supra note 6 (noting judge's
discretion to decrease base offense level by two levels if defendant accepts
responsibility).
37. See id. (assigning Category I as least serious level and Category VI as most
serious level).
38. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.4; see also Ashley A.
Halfman, Giving Offenders What They Deserve: Amendments to Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines Section 2G2.2, Addressing Child Pornography Distribution, 36 GA. L. REV. 219, 221
(2001) (noting Sentencing Guidelines regulate determination of sentences); Kait-
lin McKelvie et al., Twenty-Ninth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Sentencing, 88
GEO. L.J. 1483, 1483 (2000) (explaining Sentencing Guidelines apply to offenders
who committed crimes after November 1, 1987). See generallyJames T. Skuthan &
Rosemary T. Cakmis, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 51 MERCER L. REV. 1189 (2000)
(detailing Eleventh Circuit's review of numerous issues related to Sentencing
Guidelines).
39. For a discussion of how multiple counts can increase the base offense
level, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
40. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.2 (describing circum-
stances in which multiple counts will be grouped together for sentencing
purposes).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 3D1.2(b). Although subsection (b) is the only pertinent section, the
statute also covers other situations in which grouping is appropriate. As stated in
the statute, they include:
(a) When counts involve the same victim and the same act or transaction.
[Vol. 10: p. 327
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guideline states that in most offenses "there will be one person who
is directly and most seriously affected by the offense and is there-
fore identifiable as the victim."43 For offenses without an identifi-
able victim, the primary victim for purposes of grouping under
section 3D1.2(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines is society in gen-
eral.44 "In such cases, the counts are grouped together" for sen-
tencing purposes "when the societal interests that are harmed are
closely related. '45 Therefore, in determining whether multiple of-
fenses should be grouped, courts must decide if society in general is
the primary victim of the defendant's offenses or if there are cer-
tain identifiable victims of the defendant's offenses. 46 More specifi-
cally, in cases involving defendants convicted of multiple counts
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252 and 2252A, which make it a crime to pos-
sess, receive, transport, distribute, ship, or reproduce child pornog-
raphy, courts must decide whether society is the primary victim of
the defendant's offenses or whether the minors depicted in the
pornography are the primary victims.
47
(c) When one of the counts embodies conduct that is treated as a specific
offense characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the guideline applicable
to another of the counts.
(d) When the offense level is determined largely on the basis of the total
amount of harm or loss, the quantity of a substance involved, or some
other measure of aggregate harm, or if the offense behavior is ongoing or
continuous in nature and the offense guideline is written to cover such
behavior.
Id. § 3D1.2(a), (c), (d).
43. Id. § 3D1.2 cmt. 2.
44. See id. (listing drug and immigration offenses as examples of offenses with
society as victim).
45. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.2 cmt. 2 (offering examples
of closely related societal interests). "Where one count . . . involves unlawfully
entering the United States and the other involves possession of fraudulent evi-
dence of citizenship, the counts are grouped together because the societal interest
harmed (the interests protected by laws governing immigration) are closely re-
lated." Id.
46. See United States v. Butler, 92 F.3d 960, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding
grouping not appropriate when crime involved fictitious victims because those vic-
tims were identifiable); United States v. Rugh, 968 F.2d 750, 755 (8th Cir. 1992)
(finding grouping appropriate when multiple counts involve same victim and same
act or transaction).
47. See United States v. Tillmon, 195 F.3d 640, 643 (11th Cir. 1999) (per
curiam) (noting court's task to determine whether society in general or minor
depicted was primary victim of defendant's crime).
7
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B. Judicial Decisions
Circuits have split on the issue of identifying the primary victim
in cases involving violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252 and 2252A.4 8 Of
those confronting this issue, only one circuit has held that society in
general is the primary victim; the other circuits that have heard the
issue have determined the primary victim was the child depicted. 49
The Fourth Circuit was the first to consider this issue in United
States v. Toler,51 holding that society in general was the primary vic-
tim of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A. 5' Toler, the defendant, was
charged and convicted on three counts: Count One, transporting
child pornography from Florida to West Virginia; Count Two, trans-
porting a minor from Florida to West Virginia with the intent to
engage in sexual conduct; and Count Three, transporting a minor
from West Virginia to Ohio with the intent to engage in sexual con-
duct.5 2 The child involved in each count was Toler's twelve-year-old
stepdaughter. 53 Toler contended that because both Counts One
and Two occurred on the interstate trip from Florida to West Vir-
ginia and because his stepdaughter was the victim of both counts,
his offenses should be grouped under section 3D1.2 (a) of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines as involving the same victim and thus the same
harm. 54 The court found that the primary interest to be protected
48. See United States v. Shutic, 274 F.3d 1123, 1126 (7th Cir. 2001) (indicating
seven-to-one split favoring child as primary victim); Howard Anglin, The Potential
Liability of Federal Law-Enforcement Agents Engaged in Undercover Child Pornography In-
vestigations, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1090, 1103-08 (2002) (discussing same).
49. See Tillmon, 195 F.3d at 645 (finding that primary victim of transporting
child pornography was child portrayed); United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926, 930
(5th Cir. 1998) (determining primary victim of receiving child pornography to be
child portrayed); United States v. Hibbler, 159 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1998) (rul-
ing child portrayed as primary victim of possessing and distributing child pornog-
raphy); United States v. Boos, 127 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that
primary victim of distributing child pornography was child depicted); United
States v. Ketcham, 80 F.3d 789, 793 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding child portrayed as
primary victim of receiving, transporting, distributing, and recording child por-
nography); United States v. Rugh, 968 F.2d 750, 756 (8th Cir. 1992) (determining
primary victim of receiving child pornography to be child depicted); United States
v. Toler, 901 F.2d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that primary victim of trans-
porting child pornography was society in general).
50. 901 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1990).
51. See id. at 403.
52. See id. at 400. Count One was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A, and
Counts Two and Three were violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2423. See id.
53. See id. A search of Toler's car turned up twelve pornographic photos of
his stepdaughter. See id.
54. See id. at 403. Toler did not argue that Count Three should be grouped as
well because Count Three, involving Toler's trip from West Virginia to Ohio, did
not involve "the same act or transaction" as Counts One and Two. See id. at 403 n.4
(quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.2(a) (1987)). For a discus-
[Vol. 10: p. 327
8
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol10/iss2/4
2003] SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 335
under Count Two was the individual victimized minor, Toler's step-
daughter.55 In contrast, the court found that the primary interest
protected under Count One was society in general, and the child
depicted in the pornography was a secondary victim. 5 6 Therefore,
Toler's offenses were not grouped and his resulting sentence was
longer than it would have been had the court grouped the of-
fenses.57 Since Toler, every other circuit to consider the issue has
held to the contrary and has found the primary victim under 18
U.S.C. §§ 2252 and 2252A to be the individual child depicted, not
society in general. 58
In United States v. Rugh,59 the Eighth Circuit also weighed in on
the issue and departed from Toler in holding that the primary vic-
tim of an 18 U.S.C. § 2252 violation was the child depicted in the
pornographic material.6° Rugh was charged and convicted on two
counts of receiving child pornography through the mail in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). 6 1 Rugh contended that his two counts
sion of section 3D1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines, see supra notes 33-45 and ac-
companying text.
55. See Toler, 901 F.2d at 403.
56. See id. In its reasoning, the court relied primarily on the report that "ex-
presses the fear that unless the dissemination of child pornography is checked, it
could contribute to a continuing cycle of child abuse." Id. at 403 n.5 (citing S. REP.
No. 95438, at 5-9 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 4346). Further, the
court noted, "[t]he use of children as prostitutes or as the subjects of porno-
graphic materials is very harmful to both the children and the society as a whole."
Id. (quoting S. REp. No. 95438, at 5).
57. See id. at 403. Because Counts One and Two were not grouped, Toler's
offenses fell within the sentencing guideline range of thirty-seven to forty-six
months, and Toler received a sentence of forty-six months. See id. Had Counts
One and Two been grouped, the sentencing range would have been reduced to a
range of thirty-three to forty-one months. See id.
58. See United States v. Tillmon, 195 F.3d 640, 645 (11th Cir. 1999) (per
curiam) (finding that primary victim of transporting child pornography was child
portrayed); United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926, 930 (5th Cir. 1998) (determining
primary victim of receiving child pornography to be child portrayed); United
States v. Hibbler, 159 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1998) (ruling child portrayed as pri-
mary victim of possessing and distributing child pornography); United States v.
Boos, 127 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that primary victim of distribut-
ing child pornography was child depicted); United States v. Ketcham, 80 F.3d 789,
793 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding child portrayed as primary victim of receiving, trans-
porting, distributing, and recording child pornography); United States v. Rugh,
968 F.2d 750, 756 (8th Cir. 1992) (determining primary victim of receiving child
pornography to be child depicted).
59. 968 F.2d 750 (8th Cir. 1992).
60. See id. at 756.
61. See id. at 753 (reviewing charges and procedural posture of case). The two
counts were the result of Rugh's receipt of pornographic pictures of children on
two separate occasions, each depicting different children. See id. at 755. The first
picture was received on February 22, 1990, and the second was received on March
10, 1990. See id.
9
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should be grouped together for sentencing purposes under section
3D1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines because each count involved
the same primary victim. 62 Relying on the Fourth Circuit in Toler,
Rugh argued that although different children were depicted in
these pictures, the primary victim of his offense was society in gen-
eral and the individual children were only secondary victims. 6 3
The Eighth Circuit rejected the Fourth Circuit's analysis in To-
ler64 Instead, the court noted that although Congress expressed
concerns on the societal effects of child pornography in enacting
18 U.S.C. § 2252, its primary concern was for the children depicted
in the pornography.65 In particular, the court cited the Senate Re-
port on 18 U.S.C. § 2252, which detailed the harms to the individ-
ual children involved in child pornography.66 The court noted:
[S]uch encounters cannot help but have a deep psycho-
logical, humiliating impact on these youngsters and jeop-
ardize the possibility of healthy, affectionate relationships
in the future. Indeed, such children often grow up in an
adult life of drugs and prostitution . . . [and] tend to be-
come child molesters themselves, thus continuing the vi-
cious cycle.67
Thus, the court concluded that the children depicted were the pri-
mary victims of Rugh's crime under the statute. 68 Accordingly, the
court refused to group Rugh's counts, and the district court's sen-
tence of a fifteen-month imprisonment was affirmed.6 9
62. See id. For a discussion of section 3D1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines, see
supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
63. See Rugh, 968 F.2d at 755 (citing Toter, 901 F.2d at 403). For a discussion
of the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Toler, see supra notes 50-57 and accompanying
text.
64. See Rugh, 968 F.2d at 755-56 (explaining how secondary effect on society at
large does not diminish child's depiction as primary victim).
65. See id. at 755 (noting child as primary victim and society as secondary
victim).
66. See id.
67. Id. at 756 (quoting S. REP. No. 95-438, at 9 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 46).
68. See id.
69. See Rugh, 968 F.2d at 756. Because the offenses were not grouped, Rugh's
sentencing range was fifteen to twenty-one months. See id. at 755. Had the of-
fenses been grouped, Rugh's sentencing range would have been ten to sixteen
months. See id. The district court found that the dispute over identifying the pri-
mary victim of such offenses was not significant and imposed a fifteen-month sen-
tence that corresponded to both guideline ranges. See id. The Eighth Circuit,
however, found that the dispute was not "moot" because the district court did not
state if it would have imposed the same sentence whether the offenses were
Vol. 1 : p. 327
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In United States v. Ketcham,0 the Third, Circuit was also "not per-
suaded by the Fourth Circuit's . . . conclusion in [Toler]" and held
that the primary victim of an 18 U.S.C. § 2252 offense was the child
depicted.71 Ketcham was charged and pleaded guilty to four counts
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252 involving possessing, receiving,
transporting, distributing, shipping, and reproducing child pornog-
raphy.72 The child pornography in each count depicted different
children. 73 Like Rugh, Ketcham asserted that the four counts
should be grouped for sentencing purposes under section 3D1.1 of
the Sentencing Guidelines because they all involved the same vic-
tim-society in general.74
Citing the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 2252, the court re-
jected Ketcham's grouping argument, noting that in enacting the
statute, Congress had "a deep and abiding concern for the health
and welfare of the children and youth of the United States. '' 75 The
court further stated, " [t] his is not a statute where there is no identi-
fiable victim. The fact that a criminal statute in a general sense
protects society as a whole cannot suffice to make society the pri-
mary victim. Were this the case, society would be the primary victim
of nearly every criminal statute. '76 Ultimately, the court concluded
that the primary victims of an 18 U.S.C. § 2252 offense are the chil-
dren depicted in the pornography and upheld the district court's
ruling that grouping Ketcham's offenses was inappropriate. 77
grouped or not. See id. (citing United States v. Khang, 904 F.2d 1219, 1225 (8th
Cir. 1990)).
70. 80 F.3d 789 (3d Cir. 1996).
71. Id. at 793 n.9. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Toler, see
supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
72. See Ketcham, 80 F.3d at 791. Ketcham pleaded guilty to the following spe-
cific violations: § 2252(a)(1), transporting child pornography in interstate com-
merce (Count Three); § 2252(a) (2), receiving, distributing, and reproducing
child pornography that had been shipped in interstate commerce (Counts Four
and Five); and § 2252 (a) (4) (B), possessing child pornography that had been
shipped in interstate commerce (Count Six). See id. Ketcham denied any involve-
ment in the production of child pornography. See id.
73. See id. at 792. The pornographic materials included both pictures and
film. See id.
74. See id. at 790. Ketcham did concede that if the children depicted were the
victims of his offenses, then grouping was not appropriate. See id. at 792. For a
discussion of the Eighth Circuit's decision in Rugh, see supra notes 59-69 and ac-
companying text. For a discussion of section 3D1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines,
see supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
75. Ketcham, 80 F.3d at 793 (quoting S. REP. No. 95-438, at 3 (1977), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 41).
76. Id. (inferring certain crimes have both primary and secondary victims).
77. See id. Ketcham acknowledged that the primary victims of producing
child pornography under § 2251 are the children depicted and argued that the
victims of his crimes under § 2252 were distinguishable. See id. The court noted,
11
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The Ninth Circuit was next to hear the issue in United States v.
Boos, 78 determining that the primary victim of the 18 U.S.C. § 2252
violation was the child depicted. 79 In November 1995, Boos
pleaded guilty to seven counts of distributing child pornography in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1). 80 The seven counts each in-
volved separate pictures of different children.8' On appeal, Boos
contended that the seven counts should be grouped for sentencing
purposes under section 3D1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines be-
cause they involved the same victim, society in general.8 2 Moreover,
Boos argued that society has an interest in preserving its "moral
fabric" and in protecting future generations of children from the
abuses of child pornography.8 "3
In its decision, the court relied on the definition of the word
"victim" provided for in Application Note 2 to section 3D1.2 of the
Sentencing Guidelines.8 4 The court concluded that "a common-
sense reading of the Note strongly suggests" those most affected by
child pornography, and thus the identifiable victims, are the chil-
dren depicted. 5 The court drew a distinction from "victimless" of-
fenses mentioned in the Note, such as drug and immigration
offenses, in which the harm produced is spread evenly throughout
however, that by enacting § 2252, Congress was seeking to discourage production
by depriving would-be producers of a market. See id. Thus, "[t]he primary objec-
tive of both § 2251 and § 2252 is ... the same-to protect children from exploita-
tion by producers of child pornography-and the victims of both sections are,
accordingly, the same." Id.; see also Vincent Lodato, Note, Computer-Generated Child
Pornography-Exposing Prejudice in Our First Amendment Jurisprudence?, 28 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1328, 1363-64 n.184 (1998) (discussing Ketcham court's conclusion that
purpose of criminalizing child pornography is to protect children, not society).
78. 127 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1997).
79. See id. at 1213 (affirming district court's decision not to group Boos's
counts).
80. See id. at 1209. Before entering a guilty plea, Boos was indicted on one
count of conspiring to distribute or to receive child pornography in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 371, twenty-one counts of distributing child pornography in violation of
§ 2252(a) (1), and three counts of receiving child pornography in violation of
§ 2252(a)(2). See id. at 1208.
81. See id. at 1209.
82. See id. The district court concluded that grouping should not apply be-
cause the seven counts involved different children and therefore different of-
fenses. See id. The decision not to group the seven counts resulted in Boos's
offense level being raised to a sentencing range of thirty to thirty-seven months.
See id. Boos was sentenced to thirty months. See id.
83. See Boos, 127 F.3d at 1209 (setting forth Boos's argument that society is
harmed due to "proliferation" of child pornography).
84. See id. For a discussion of Application Note 2 to section 3D1.2 of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines and its definition of "victim," see supra notes 33-45 and accom-
panying text.
85. Boos, 127 F.3d at 1210.
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society. 8 6 In contrast, the court noted that "distribution of child
pornography . . . is visited upon a single individual or discrete
group of individuals, namely, the child or children used in the pro-
duction of the pornographic material." 87 The court also used the
Webster's dictionary definition of "victim" to show that it is the chil-
dren depicted who are both physically and psychologically injured
as a result of the pornographer's conduct.88
The court further concluded that when Congress enacted 18
U.S.C. § 2252, it considered the children depicted to be the pri-
mary victims of the offense.8 9 The court stated that "[a] ccording to
the Senate Report, the statute was born out of 'a deep and abiding
concern for the health and welfare of the children and youth of the
United States,' and was enacted in order 'to protect and benefit
such children."' 90 Further, the court noted that the Senate Report
referred to "child pornography as a 'form of child abuse"' and "the
children involved as 'child victims' and 'boy victims.' -91 The Ninth
Circuit became the first circuit to cite to related Supreme Court
precedent for the proposition that the distribution of child pornog-
86. See id. For a discussion of Application Note 2 to section 3D1.2 of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines and its treatment of "victimless" offenses, see supra notes 43-45
and accompanying text.
87. Boos, 127 F.3d at 1210; see also Lodato, supra note 77, at 1363 (explaining
Congress's primary purpose in criminalizing child pornography "is, and should
be," to protect children linked to pornography's production, and not to protect
society in general).
88. See Boos, 127 F.3d at 1210. The dictionary definition of "victim" referred
to by the court was "one that is acted on and usually adversely affected by a force or
agent... [;] one that is injured, destroyed, or sacrificed under any of various conditions
.. [;] one that is subjected to oppression, hardship, or mistreatment... [;] one that is
tricked or duped .... Id. (emphasis added) (quoting WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COL
LEGIATE DICTIONARY 1314 (1986)). Applying this definition, the court found:
[I]t was the children depicted-and not society at large-who were "ac-
ted on" and "adversely affected," who oftentimes were "forced" to partici-
pate in the production of the pornography in which Boos traded, who
were "injured" (both physically and psychologic ally) as a result of Boos's
patronage of the porn industry, who were "sacrificed" to satisfy Boos's
curiosities, who were "subjected" to the cruelest form of "oppression,
hardship, [and] mistreatment" at the hands of pornography producers
and photographers, and whose lives were quite possibly "destroyed" in
the process.
Id.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 1211 (quoting S. REP. No. 95-438, at 41 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 43). Boos made only a single cite to the Senate Report in support
of his argument, stating that the use of children in child pornography "is very
harmful to both children and society as a whole." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 95-438,
at 40). The court noted, however, that this statement undermined Boos's argu-
ment rather than supported it because it simply recognized a dual harm to society
and to the child depicted. See id.
91. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 95438, at 45-46).
13
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raphy was "intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children....
[T] he materials produced are a permanent record of the children's
participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their cir-
culation."9 2 The Commentary to the Application Notes, the ordi-
nary definition of the term "victim," the legislative history behind
18 U.S.C. § 2252, and related Supreme Court precedent all led the
court to "hold that it is the children depicted-not society at
large-who are the primary 'victims' of the crime of distributing
child pornography. " 9
In United States v. Hibbler,94 the Sixth Circuit sided with the
growing number of circuits disagreeing with Toler to hold that the
children depicted are the primary victims under 18 U.S.C. § 2252. 5
Hibbler was found guilty on seven counts of shipping child pornog-
raphy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) and one count of pos-
sessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (a) (4).96
Each of the seven counts of the shipping charge involved sexually
92. Id. (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982)); see also Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009-26
(1996) ("Congress finds that... where children are used in its production, child
pornography permanently records the victim's abuse, and its continued existence
causes the child victims of sexual abuse continuing harm by haunting those chil-
dren in future years."); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) (noting pornog-
raphy's continued existence causes child victims continuing harm for years to
come); Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 1237 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 4 (1996) (statement by United States Senator
Joseph Biden) ("The abuse of the children involved does not end when their par-
ticipation in making pornography ends. It continues as long as the record of the
material exists."); Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L.
REv. 209, 216 (2001) ("The initial act of abuse takes on a life of its own, exposing
the child to perpetual reinjury[.]"); David P. Shouvlin, Preventing the Sexual Exploita-
tion of Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535, 545 (1981) (describing
child's continued "distressfil feeling" because act has been recorded); John C.
Scheller, Note, PC Peep Show: Computers, Privacy, and Child Pornography, 27 J. MAR
SHALL L. REV. 989, 1013 (1994) (" [T]he act of child pornography is not an end in
itself.").
93. Boos, 127 F.3d at 1213.
94. 159 F.3d 233 (6th Cir. 1998).
95. See id. at 237.
96. See id. at 236. Hibbler was charged in a seventeen-count indictment that
included:
[C]onspiracy to ship and receive images depicting child pornography, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, receiving by computer transmission sexually
explicit images of children, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (2), send-
ing such images by computer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (a) (1), and
possession of at least three computer files containing visual images of
child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (4).
Id. at 235-36. Hibbler was convicted on eight counts-seven counts of shipping
and one count of possessing-but was acquitted of the other nine counts. See id. at
236.
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explicit images depicting different children.97 In its holding, the
court relied solely on the analyses in Ketcham and Boos.98 The court
approved of the Ketcham court's analysis of the word "victim" in Ap-
plication Note 2 to section 3D1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines, stat-
ing that the primary victim of a crime is society in only those
instances with no identifiable victim.99 Citing Boos, the court found
that the children depicted are directly and most seriously affected
and thus identifiable as primary victims of child pornography. 10°
Further, the court agreed with the Boos court's assessment that
"quite unlike the drug and immigration offenses mentioned in [Ap-
plication] Note [2 to section 3D1.2]-which are 'victimless' crimes
in the sense that the harm that they produce is spread
evenly throughout society-the harm caused by the distribution of
child pornography is concentrated [upon the child]."'' Finally,
the court also concurred with the Boos court's interpretation that
the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 2252 "clearly considered" the
children depicted to be the primary victims. 10 2 Accordingly, the
Sixth Circuit held that the primary victims of the child pornography
distributed and possessed by Hibbler were the children depicted."I)-
Shortly thereafter, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Norrist 4
also concluded that the children depicted were the primary victims
under 18 U.S.C. § 2252.105 Norris, the defendant, pleaded guilty to
ten counts of receiving child pornography that had been trans-
ported in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C.
97. See id. at 237.
98. See id. (noting society in general as primary victim only when no identifi-
able victim). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis in Ketcham, see supra
notes 70-77 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's analysis
in Boos, see supra notes 78-93 and accompanying text.
99. See Hibder, 159 F.3d at 237 (citing United States v. Ketcham, 80 F.3d 789,
792-93 (3d Cir. 1996)). For a discussion of Application Note 2 to section 3D1.2 of
the Sentencing Guidelines and its definition of "victim," see supra notes 43-45 and
accompanying text.
100. See Hibbler, 159 F.3d at 237 (citing Boos, 127 F.3d at 1210).
101. Id. (quoting Boos, 127 F.3d at 1210).
102. See id. (citing Boos, 127 F.3d at 1211). In determining that the legislative
history of § 2252 "clearly considered" the children depicted to be the primary vic-
tims of the offense, the Boos court relied on the report to § 2252, which stated that
"of deep concern to the Committee is the effect of child pornography ... on the
children who become involved .... Such encounters cannot help but have a deep
psychological, humiliating impact on these youngsters and jeopardize the possibil-
ity of healthy, affectionate relationships in the future." Boos, 127 F.3d at 1211
(quoting S. REP. No. 95438, at 46 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 44).
103. See Hibbler, 159 F.3d at 237 (refusing to group Hibbler's counts).
104. 159 F.3d 926 (5th Cir. 1998).
105. See id. at 931 (affirming district court's determination that children de-
picted were primary victims).
15
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§ 2252 (a) (2).I06 As a result, the district court sentenced Norris to a
seventy-eight-month imprisonment. 107  On appeal, Norris con-
tended that the district court erred by refusing to group his of-
fenses under section 3D1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines. 0 8 Norris
argued that when he committed the crime of receiving child por-
nography, the children depicted were not victimized during that
specific act, but rather when the pornographic material was pro-
duced. 109 According to Norris, the crime of receiving child pornog-
raphy is a victimless crime in which the children depicted can be
only secondary or indirect victims. 0
The Fifth Circuit rejected Norris's view, noting that "the 'vic-
timization' of the children involved does not end when the
pornographer's camera is put away."' I The court then outlined
three ways in which the consumer or end-recipient of child pornog-
raphy can cause the children depicted in such pornography to suf-
fer harm as a result of that person's actions. First, the court noted
that "[t] he materials produced are a permanent record of the chil-
dren's participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their cir-
culation."112 Therefore, "[t] he consumer who 'merely' or 'passively'
receives or possesses child pornography directly contributes to this
continuing victimization."'"13 Second, the court noted that "the
mere existence of child pornography represents an invasion of the
106. See id. at 927. In addition to the ten counts of receiving child pornogra-
phy, Norris was indicted on one count of possessing child pornography in violation
of § 2252(a) (4) (B). See id. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Norris pleaded guilty to
the ten counts of receiving, and the one count of possessing was dropped. See id.
107. See id. at 928.
108. See id. The United States probation officer originally recommended
grouping the ten counts and imposing a total offense level of eighteen and a crimi-
nal history category of I, which would have carried an imprisonment range of
twenty-one to thirty-three months. See id. In response to a request by the district
court, however, the probation office prepared a new report rescinding the group-
ing analysis, and a five level increase was added to Norris's total offense level to
account for his multiple convictions. See id. at 928. Further, a four-level increase
was added to Norris's total offense level because the pornographic items he re-
ceived depicted acts of violence. See id. As a result, Norris's total offense level
increased nine levels to twenty-seven, resulting in an imprisonment range of sev-
enty to eighty-seven months. See id.
109. See Norris, 159 F.3d at 929.
110. See id. (discussing defendant's argument that no children were victim-
ized by act of receiving child pornography).
111. Id.; see also Shouvlin, supra note 92, at 545 (noting child must live with
knowledge that depiction is circulating throughout public).
112. Norris, 159 F.3d at 929 (emphasis added) (quoting New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982)). For further authority supporting this proposition, see
supra note 92.
113. Norris, 159 F.3d at 930.
16
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privacy of the child depicted."' 1 4 Citing the Supreme Court and
the Congressional Record, the court explained that the distribution
of child pornography violates "the [child's] individual interests in
* . . disclosure of personal matters"' 15 and "invades the child's pri-
vacy and reputational interests."'116 Third, the recipients or con-
sumers of child pornography victimize the children depicted by
enabling and supporting the continued production of child por-
nography, which entails continuous direct abuse and victimization
of child subjects. 17 The court found no sense in distinguishing be-
tween the producers and consumers of child pornography because
neither could exist without the other. 118 The court concluded,
therefore, that the victims of the crime of receiving child pornogra-
phy are the children depicted. 119
In United States v. Tillmon,120 the Eleventh Circuit joined the
other circuits that rejected Toler to hold that the primary victims
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252 and 2252A are the individual children de-
picted, not society in general.' 2' The defendant, Tillmon, pleaded
guilty to three counts of transporting child pornography in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1). 12 2 The district court refused to
group Tillmon's three counts of child pornography, each of which
depicted a different child, and sentenced him to an eighty-seven-
month imprisonment. 23 On appeal, Tillmon relied on the Fourth
Circuit's interpretation of the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 2252
in Toler to argue that the primary victim of his three counts was
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 n.10 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 599 (1977))).
116. See id. (quoting Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-
208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009-26 (1996)); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002) ("[E]ach new publication of the speech would cause new
injury to the child's reputation and emotional well-being.").
117. See Norris, 159 F.3d at 930 (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109-12
(1990); Ferber, 458 U.S. at 755-56); see also United States v. Richardson, 238 F.3d
837, 839 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Concern with the welfare of the children who are used
to create pornography is part of the public concern over child pornography ....
and this makes the receiver a greater malefactor than the possessor.").
118. See Norris, 159 F.3d at 930.
119. See id. at 931.
120. 195 F.3d 640 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
121. See id. at 645 (affirming district court's decision refusing to group
Tillmon's counts).
122. See id. at 641. Tillmon also pleaded guilty to one count of soliciting a
minor for a sex act in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). See id.
123. See id. If Tillmon's offenses had been grouped, his offense level would
have been lowered from twenty-eight to twenty-five. See id. n.1. This would have
reduced his sentencing range from eighty-seven to one hundred eight months to a
sentencing range of sixty-three to seventy-eight months. See id.
17
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society in general and not the individual children depicted. 124
Tillmon also attempted to distinguish his crime of transportation of
child pornography from the crime of producing child pornogra-
phy.' 25 In so doing, Tillmon contended that although the minors
depicted were victimized when the pornography was produced, the
minors were not harmed further when the pornography was trans-
ported across state lines. '2 6 In response, the court sided with the
other circuits that rejected Toler to conclude that the legislative his-
tory of 18 U.S.C. § 2252 makes it clear that the statute's purpose is
to lessen the harm suffered by children. 127 The court also sided
with the other circuits that rejected the defendant's attempts to dis-
tinguish between the victims of the production of child pornogra-
phy and the victims of the dissemination of child pornography. 28
The court acknowledged that the child may be more "immediately"
harmed by the child pornography's production, yet the court con-
cluded that "the dissemination of that material certainly exacer-
bates that harm, not only by constituting a continuing invasion of
privacy but by providing the very market that led to the creation of
the images in the first place."'' 29 As a result, the court held that the
primary identifiable victim of the crime of transporting child por-
nography was the child depicted in the image.' 3 0
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYsIS
George Sherman's conviction on charges of possessing, receiv-
ing, and shipping child pornography in interstate commerce gave
the Seventh Circuit its first opportunity to determine whether the
124. See id. at 643. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of
the legislative history of § 2252 in Toler, see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
125. See Tillmnon, 195 F.3d at 644 (discussing defendant's argument that "dis-
semination" of child pornography primarily offends society).
126. See id. (noting defendant's argument that child depicted was not affected
most directly or seriously).
127. See id. at 643-44 (citing United States v. Boos, 127 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th
Cir. 1997); United States v. Ketcham, 80 F.3d 789, 793 (3d Cir. 1996); United
States v. Rugh, 968 F.2d 750, 755 (8th Cir. 1992)); see also Lodato, supra note 77, at
1347 n.87 ("[C]ongress' [sic] primary and sole objective in prohibiting child por-
nography is to protect the children who are victimized when the material is cre-
ated .... ).
128. See Tillmon, 195 F.3d at 644.
129. Id. (citing United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926, 929 (5th Cir. 1998); Boos,
127 F.3d at 1211 n.1; Ketchamn, 80 F.3d at 793); see also Child Pornography Preven-
tion Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009-26 (1996) (providing crea-
tion or distribution of child pornography invades child's privacy and reputational
interests); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (noting child's "individual in-
terest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters").
130. See Tillmon, 195 F.3d at 645.
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primary victims of such crimes are the children depicted or society
in general.' 3 ' With its decision, the majority aligned itself with the
six other circuits that held that the primary victims of such crimes
were the children depicted. 3 2 In his dissent, however, Judge Pos-
ner aligned himself with the Fourth Circuit, the only circuit to hold
that the primary victim of such crimes was society in general. 133
At trial, Sherman contended that his three counts should be
grouped because "victim" under section 3D1.2 of the Sentencing
Guidelines "does not include secondary or indirect victims ... and
that for the crimes of shipping, possessing, and receiving child por-
nography, the main victim is society" at large and the children de-
picted are only secondary victims. 13 4 Although Sherman conceded
that the children depicted in his case were the primary victims of
crimes involving the production of child pornography, he con-
tended that his "passive viewing" caused the depicted children no
additional harm. 135 At trial, the district court rejected Sherman's
argument that his counts should be grouped and imposed a thirty-
month sentence. 36
131. See United States v. Sherman, 268 F.3d 539, 542 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting
case of first impression and responsibility to identify primary victim of possessing,
receiving, and shipping child pornography).
132. See id. at 550.
133. See id. at 550-52 (Posner, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 541.
135. See id.
136. See Sherman, 268 F.3d at 541. In refusing to group Sherman's counts, the
district court "focused on the so-called market[-]maker theory of victimization...
[,] believ[ing that] Sherman [indirectly] harmed these children by creating a mar-
ket demand for the production of child pornography." Id. at 546. The district
court concluded that no one would produce child pornography if no one would
buy it. See id. Sherman contended that the district court's focus on the indirect
harm caused by the market-maker theory of victimization gave insufficient evi-
dence for refusing to group his counts because the government failed to show
"that Sherman's desire to watch [child] pornography encouraged the production
of" the specific material that he possessed. See id. The Seventh Circuit took issue
with the district court's reliance on the market-maker theory in that it "provides
only an indirect link between a particular child used in the production of [the
child] pornography and a later purchaser or possessor of the material" when sec-
tion 3D1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines requires the identification of a "primary"
or "direct" victim. See id. The court noted that "the market[-]maker theory is a
thin reed on which to rest the grouping decision" because it "precludes the consid-
eration of indirect harm," and therefore the court did not rest its decision on this
theory. See id.
19
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A. The Seventh Favors the Six, Not the One
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's re-
fusal to group Sherman's counts for sentencing purposes. 13 7 In do-
ing so, the Seventh Circuit joined the six other circuits to hold the
primary victims of crimes under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252 and 2252A in-
volving possessing, receiving, transporting, distributing, shipping,
and reproducing child pornography are the children depicted.'3 8
Relying on the rationale expressed by related Supreme Court pre-
cedent in New York v. Ferber,139 the court premised its holding on
the theory that "[t] he possession, receipt and shipping of child por-
nography directly victimizes the children portrayed by violating
their right to privacy, and in particular violating their individual in-
terest in avoiding the disclosure of personal matters."' 40 In support
of its theory, the court noted:
Because the child's actions are reduced to a recording, the
pornography may haunt him in future years, long after the
original misdeed took place. A child who has posed for a
camera must go through life knowing that the recording is
circulating within the mass distribution system for child
pornography. 14'
Also, the court found that children suffer severe emotional
problems "from a fear of exposure and the tension of keeping the
abuse secret." 14 2
137. See id. at 550 (holding child depicted as primary victim of possessing,
receiving, and distributing child pornography).
138. See United States v. Tillmon, 195 F.3d 640, 645 (11th Cir. 1999) (per
curiam) (finding that primary victim of transporting child pornography was child
portrayed); United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926, 930 (5th Cir. 1998) (determining
primary victim of receiving child pornography to be child portrayed); United
States v. Hibbler, 159 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1998) (ruling child portrayed as pri-
mary victim of possessing and distributing child pornography); United States v.
Boos, 127 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that primary victim of distribut-
ing child pornography was child depicted); United States v. Ketcham, 80 F.3d 789,
793 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding child portrayed as primary victim of receiving, trans-
porting, distributing, and recording child pornography); United States v. Rugh,
968 F.2d 750, 756 (8th Cir. 1992) (determining primary victim of receiving child
pornography to be child depicted). But see United States v. Toler, 901 F.2d 399,
403 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that primary victim of transporting child pornogra-
phy was society in general).
139. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
140. Sherman, 268 F.3d at 547 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 n.10.
141. Id. (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 n.10). For additional authority sup-
porting this proposition, see supra note 92 and accompanying text.
142. Sherman, 268 F.3d at 547 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 n.10).
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Further, the court noted that "one of the main reasons for
criminalizing the 'mere' possession of child pornography is to cre-
ate an incentive for the possessor to destroy the material and allevi-
ate some of these harms to the children depicted." 143 As a result,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that although "society at large is also
a victim of these crimes, the primary, identifiable victim is the child
portrayed, who must live with the knowledge that adults ... can
pull out a picture or watch a video that has recorded the abuse of
that child at any time."' 44
B. Judge Posner Agrees with the One, Not the Six
In his dissent, Judge Posner voiced the only judicial objection
since Toler to the conclusion that the primary victim under an 18
U.S.C. § 2252A offense is the child depicted.1 45 In doing so, Judge
Posner explained three reasons to support his contention that the
primary victim of an 18 U.S.C. § 2252A violation is society in gen-
eral. 146 First, he concluded "that the offense in [18 U.S.C.] § 2252
is more like a drug offense than it is like such offenses as murder
and robbery," which clearly have an identifiable primary victim. 147
143. Id. (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990); United States v.
Richardson, 238 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 2001)). The court relied on the Supreme
Court's statement in Osborne that "[t] he State's ban on possession and viewing en-
courages the possessors of these materials to destroy them." Id. (quoting Osborne,
495 U.S. at 111). The court also relied on the Richardson court's statement that
"[c] oncern with the welfare of the children who are used to create pornography is
part of the public concern over child pornography .... and this makes the receiver
a greater malefactor than the possessor." Id. (quoting Richardson, 238 F.3d at 839);
see also Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat.
3009-26 (1996) (describing how punishing end-recipient of child pornography les-
sens harm to child by encouraging possessor to destroy material and eliminates
market for material).
144. Sherman, 268 F.3d at 547-48.
145. See id. at 550-52 (Posner, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Tillmon,
195 F.3d 640, 645 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (lacking dissenting opinion);
United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926, 931 (5th Cir. 1998) (showing no dissent);
United States v. Hibbler, 159 F.3d 233, 238 (6th Cir. 1998) (MerrittJ., concurring
in part, dissenting in part) (dissenting from different part of holding); United
States v. Boos, 127 F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 1997) (showing no dissenting opin-
ion); United States v. Ketcham, 80 F.3d 789, 796 (3d Cir. 1996) (lacking dissent);
United States v. Rugh, 968 F.2d 750, 756 (8th Cir. 1992) (indicating no dissent
from holdings that children depicted are primary victims of § 2252 violations).
Judge Posner believed it was important that the whole court hear the case because
it "consider[ed] why child pornography, [which has been] a growing subject of
federal criminal prosecution, has been criminalized." Sherman, 268 F.3d at 550
(Posner, J., dissenting).
146. See Sherman, 268 F.3d at 550-52 (Posner, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 551 (Posner, J., dissenting). The Sentencing Guidelines list drug
and immigration offenses as examples of crimes having society in general as the
primary victim. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.2 cmt. 2 (2002).
21
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According to Judge Posner, although society in general is the pri-
mary concern of drug and immigration offenses, identifiable secon-
dary victims are involved often in these offenses and are not to be
considered in deciding whether the offenses should be grouped. 48
Thus, even though children "may be degraded, exploited, and
therefore victimized" by being depicted in child pornography, "they
are not the primary victims."'149
Second, Judge Posner noted that Congress amended the defi-
nition of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A clearly to in-
clude pornography created by realistic computer simulations or
with adult models made to look like children. 150 With this amend-
ment, Congress did not proscribe a lighter sentence for crimes that
do not involve children. 51 In fact, "the sentencing provisions are
148. See Sherman, 268 F.3d at 551 (PosnerJ., dissenting). Judge Posner noted
that drug offenses have identifiable secondary victims such as "the 'mIles' who die
when the bags of cocaine that they've swallowed burst, the wives and girlfriends
who are roped into assisting their husbands or boyfriends in the drug trade, the
drug dealers killed in gang wars, and the addicts who turn to selling drugs to sup-
port their habit." Id. (Posner, J., dissenting). judge Posner pointed out, however,
that the primary concern in criminalizing drug offenses is not with these victims,
"but with the consumption of the drugs and with the entire range of consequences
thought to flow from that consumption." Id. (Posner, J., dissenting). Judge Pos-
ner noted:
Similarly many illegal immigrants are abused, sometimes even enslaved,
by employers or by the traffickers in illegal immigrants, but the chief con-
cern behind the restrictions on immigration is not with those unfortu-
nates but with the effect of unrestricted immigration on citizen
employment, on crime, and on welfare and other government programs.
Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
149. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
150. See id. (Posner, J., dissenting) (describing Congress's clear intent to in-
clude pornography without child victims). The statute defines "child pornogra-
phy" for purposes of § 2252A as:
[A]ny visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or
computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or
produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit
conduct, where
(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct;
(C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to ap-
pear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
or
(D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, described,
or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the ma-
terial is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct[.]
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2000). But seeAshcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234
(2002) (holding § 2256(8) (B) and (D) overbroad and unconstitutional).
151. See Sherman, 268 F.3d at 551 (Posner, J., dissenting); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A(b)(1)-(2) (2000) (describing sentences for violation of statute).
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the same regardless of whether children were used."'152 Further,
Posner pointed out that the Senate Report states that "computer-
generated child pornography poses the same threat to the well be-
ing of children as photographic child pornography" because they
both incite child molestation.1 53 He believed that this statement
would be meaningless if the victims of child pornography were the
children depicted in the explicit images.1 54 Based on the parallel
concerns expressed by the statute and the report regarding com-
puter-generated and actual pornography, Judge Posner concluded
that the primary concern of child pornography is that it "incites
child molestation. '"1 55 Therefore, he felt that it could be inferred
that the primary victim is not the child depicted, but "the child se-
duced or molested by a pedophile stimulated by such pornography"
as well as "the adult population."' 56
The final point of the dissent was that grouping multiple
counts of child pornography under section 3D1.2 of the Sentencing
Guidelines is necessary to prevent "absurd" results.1 57 Referring to
United States v. Richardson,158 a case involving 70,000 separate sexu-
ally explicit images of minors that were downloaded by the defen-
dant, Judge Posner questioned whether there would be 70,000
victims if a different child were depicted in each image. 59 If so, he
152. Sherman, 268 F.3d at 551 (Posner, J., dissenting); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A(b)(1)-(2) (2000) (providing same sentences for crimes not involving ac-
tual children).
153. See Sherman, 268 F.3d at 552 (Posner, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. No.
104-358, at 15 (1996)). The report further states:
The effect of visual depictions of child sexual activity on a child molester
or pedophile using that material to stimulate or whet his own sexual ap-
petites [and] the danger to children who are seduced and molested with
the aid of child sex pictures [are] just as great when the child
pornographer or child molester uses visual depictions of child sexual ac-
tivity produced wholly or in part by electronic, mechanical, or other
means, including by computer, as when the material consists of un-
retouched photographic images of actual children engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.
Id. (Posner, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. No. 104-358, at 2). But see Ashcrofi, 535
U.S. at 253 (rejecting government's argument that virtual child pornography in-
cites illegal conduct).
154. See Sherman, 268 F.3d at 552 (Posner, J., dissenting) (noting govern-
ment's reliance on report for its position).
155. See id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
156. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
157. See id. (Posner, J., dissenting) (providing interpretation of statute and
report's principal purpose in criminalizing child pornography).
158. 238 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2001).
159. See Sherman, 268 F.3d at 552 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citing Richardson,
238 F.3d at 839). Posner's question is only hypothetical because in Richardson, the
70,000 images did not depict different children. See Richardson, 238 F.3d at 839.
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believed "[t]he result would be the imposition in many and per-
haps most cases of the maximum statutory penalty[.]' '1 60
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Eight circuits have addressed the issue of identifying the pri-
mary victim of child pornography. 16' With its decision, the Seventh
Circuit became the seventh court of appeals that has determined
the primary victims of crimes under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252 and 2252A to
be the children depicted. 162 The majority, citing related Supreme
Court precedent, premised its holding solely on the "main ratio-
nale" that "[t] he possession, receipt and shipping of child pornog-
raphy directly victimizes the children portrayed by violating their
right to privacy, and in particular violating their individual interest
160. Sherman, 268 F.3d at 552 (Posner, J., dissenting). The maximum penalty
for a violation of § 2252A(a) (1)-(4) is fifteen years if the defendant is not a recidi-
vist and thirty years if the defendant is a recidivist. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b) (1)
(2000). Posner conceded that "extra counts can never require the addition of more
than five additional offense levels." Sherman, 268 F.3d at 552 (Posner, J., dissent-
ing). Posner based his reasoning on the fact that the background notes to the
guidelines indicate that when a crime involves additional victims, the sentencing
judge may impose a longer sentence than the one provided for by the guidelines.
See id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
161. See Sherman, 268 F.3d at 539, 547 (holding child depicted as primary vic-
tim of possessing, receiving, and distributing child pornography); United States v.
Tillmon, 195 F.3d 640, 645 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (finding that primary
victim of transporting child pornography was child portrayed); United States v.
Norris, 159 F.3d 926, 930 (5th Cir. 1998) (determining primary victim of receiving
child pornography to be child portrayed); United States v. Hibbler, 159 F.3d 233,
237 (6th Cir. 1998) (ruling child portrayed as primary victim of possessing and
distributing child pornography); United States v. Boos, 127 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th
Cir. 1997) (holding that primary victim of distributing child pornography was
child depicted); United States v. Ketcham, 80 F.3d 789, 793 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding
child portrayed as primary victim of receiving, transporting, distributing, and re-
cording child pornography); United States v. Rugh, 968 F.2d 750, 756 (8th Cir.
1992) (determining primary victim of receiving child pornography to be child de-
picted); United States v. Toler, 901 F.2d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that
primary victim of transporting child pornography was society in general).
162. See Sherman, 268 F.3d at 539, 547 (holding child depicted as primary vic-
tim of possessing, receiving, and distributing child pornography); United States v.
Tillmon, 195 F.3d 640, 645 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (finding that primary
victim of transporting child pornography was child portrayed); United States v.
Norris, 159 F.3d 926, 930 (5th Cir. 1998) (determining primary victim of receiving
child pornography to be child portrayed); United States v. Hibbler, 159 F.3d 233,
237 (6th Cir. 1998) (ruling child portrayed as primary victim of possessing and
distributing child pornography); United States v. Boos, 127 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th
Cir. 1997) (holding that primary victim of distributing child pornography was
child depicted); United States v. Ketcham, 80 F.3d 789, 793 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding
child portrayed as primary victim of receiving, transporting, distributing, and re-
cording child pornography); United States v. Rugh, 968 F.2d 750, 756 (8th Cir.
1992) (determining primary victim of receiving child pornography to be child
depicted).
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in avoiding the disclosure of personal matters."163 Given Judge Pos-
ner's strong dissent, the majority should have gone further. 16 4
In his dissent, Judge Posner articulated three main rationales
for concluding that the primary victim of such crimes is society in
general. 65 In fact, his opinion is the only judicial analysis since the
Fourth Circuit in Toler to conclude this way. 166 Moreover, the
Fourth Circuit in Toler failed to articulate fully the reasons that led
to its conclusion, thus making Judge Posner's dissent the sole voice
expounding this interpretation of the primary victim of child por-
nography. 167 In spite of this, the majority never addressed directly
any of the dissent's three rationales. Because the overwhelming
weight of the court favored the position that the primary victim was
the child depicted, the majority should have addressed and rebut-
ted Posner's dissent.1 68
The majority should have addressed the dissent's argument
that child pornography offenses are similar to the drug and immi-
gration offenses listed in the Application Note 2 to section 3D1.2 of
the Sentencing Guidelines, which states that the primary victim of
such offenses is society in general. 169 Although the Sherman major-
ity never directly addressed this argument, the Ninth and Sixth Cir-
cuits did make a distinction.1 70 The Ninth Circuit categorized the
drug and immigration offenses of the Application Note as "vic-
timless" crimes because the harm they produce is spread evenly
163. Sherman, 268 F.3d at 547 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759
n.10 (1982)). In its opinion, the court did outline the different reasoning relied
on by the other circuits to decide the issue, but it presented only the "right to
privacy" argument, which it called the "main rationale." See id. at 542-45 (discuss-
ing other circuits' holdings and reasoning). Three other circuits also incorporated
this "right to privacy" argument into their reasoning. See Tillmon, 195 F.3d at 644;
Norris, 159 F.3d at 929-30; Boos, 127 F.3d at 1211.
164. For a discussion of judge Posner's dissent, see supra notes 145-60 and
accompanying text.
165. See Sherman, 268 F.3d at 550-53 (Posner, J., dissenting).
166. SeeAnglin, supra note 48, at 1104 n.79 (describing Judge Posner's dissent
as lone objection since Toler).
167. See id. at 1105 ("[Olne wishes the [Toler] court had explained more
clearly the process by which it reached . . . [its] conclusion.").
168. See Sherman, 268 F.3d at 542 (noting circuit split heavily favors child de-
picted as primary victim). Although the majority did not directly discuss the three
main rationales expressed by the dissent, it did indirectly discuss one of them when
detailing the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Boos. See id. at 544. This rationale indi-
rectly discussed and rebutted the dissent's view that drug and immigration offenses
are similar to child pornography offenses. See id.
169. For a discussion of the dissent's argument that such offenses are similar,
see supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
170. See United States v. Hibbler, 159 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Boos, 127 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 1997).
25
Manos: Who Are the Real Victims of Cild Pornography - After United State
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003
352 ViI.iANovA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
throughout society. 171 The Ninth Circuit described the harm
caused by child pornography as concentrated in that it "is visited
upon a single individual or discrete group of individuals, namely
the child or children used in the production of the pornographic
material."' 172 The Ninth Circuit also noted that child
pornographers cannot be analogized to drug users, who are their
own victims, because child pornographers victimize children, not
themselves. 17  The Sixth Circuit adopted this reasoning, stating
that the "child pornographer, quite simply, directly victimizes the
children pictured in such material. One need not know the child's
name to verify this fact."' 174 Therefore, although the Seventh Cir-
cuit did not address the dissent's argument directly on this point, at
least two other circuits addressed it previously.175
The majority also should have addressed the dissent's conten-
tion that failing to group crimes involving child pornography would
often produce absurd results. 176 While Sherman did not address this
contention directly either, it is unlikely that scenarios like the one
described by the Richardson dissent, which involved downloading
over 70,000 separate images of child pornography, would produce
absurd results because under section 3D1.4 of the Sentencing
Guidelines, extra counts can never require the addition of more
than five additional offense levels. 177 According to the Background
Note of this section, the sentencing judge can depart upward from
the guideline if there are additional victims. 178 For the dissent to
say, however, that the result would be in "many and perhaps most
cases" the imposition of the statutory maximum penalty is an over-
statement.I79 In actuality, situations in which the sentencing range
is inadequate are rare.1I" Further, numerous amendments over the
171. See Boos, 127 F.3d at 1210.
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. Hibbler, 159 F.3d at 237.
175. See id. (discussing how drug and immigration offenses differ from child
pornography offenses); Boos, 127 F.3d at 1210 (addressing differences from drug
and immigration offenses).
176. For a discussion of the dissent's argument that failing to group such of-
fenses would often lead to absurd results, see supra notes 157-60 and accompany-
ing text.
177. See United States v. Richardson, 283 F.3d 837, 838 (7th Cir. 2001); U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.4 (2002).
178. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.4.
179. See United States v. Sherman, 268 F.3d 539, 552 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner,
J., dissenting).
180. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.4 ("Situations in which
there will be inadequate scope for ensuring appropriate additional punishment...
are likely to be unusual and can be handled by departure from the guidelines.");
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years reflect the growing national concern regarding crimes involv-
ing child pornography as well as Congress's desire to inflict harsh
sentences upon these pornographers.' 8' Therefore, one has to be
skeptical of the dissent's position on this point.
Finally, the Sherman majority should have addressed the dis-
sent's argument that society in general is the primary victim of 18
U.S.C. § 2252A offenses because both the statute and the legislative
history express parallel concerns with respect to both computer-
simulated and actual child pornography. 82 The only reference the
majority made to these parallel concerns was to Boos and its deter-
mination that children are the direct victims of crimes under 18
U.S.C. § 2423(b), which criminalizes "interstate travel" for the pur-
pose of engaging in sexual activity with a child even if the child
involved is not real. 18 3 In Boos, however, Boos's appeal cited to
United States v. Butler,18 4 a Ninth Circuit case that involved fictional
characters that were created by the police as part of a sting opera-
tion.'8 5 The defendant in Butler attempted to engage in sexual acts
with specific juvenile victims and would have done so had the vic-
tims been available.18 6 The Butler court noted that "attempts are
treated the same as completed criminal acts" and concluded that
violating section 2423 is a crime against specific individuals, not so-
ciety in general.18 7 In contrast, the dissent in Sherman spoke of
computer-simulated child pornography as opposed to fictional chil-
dren created by police. 188 Therefore, under the Ninth Circuit's
analysis in Butler, to victimize children directly using computer-sim-
ulated child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A, the defendant
see also Sherman, 268 F.3d at 552 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citing no authority im-
posing such "absurd" sentences).
181. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b) (1) (2000) (providing for up to fifteen-year im-
prisonment with no prior convictions); see also Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1977)
(providing for up to only ten-year imprisonment for same crime); S. REP. No. 95-
438, at 5 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 42-43 ("Child pornography and
child prostitution have become highly organized, multimillion dollar industries
that operate on a nationwide scale."); Halfman, supra note 38, at 219 (noting child
sexual abuse is societal problem).
182. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2000). For a discussion of the dissent's parallel
concerns, see supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
183. See Sherman, 268 F.3d at 545 (citing United States v. Boos, 127 F.3d 1207,
1212 (9th Cir. 1997)).
184. 92 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 1996).
185. See Boos, 127 F.3d at 1212 (citing Butler, 92 F.3d at 964).
186. See Butler, 92 F.3d at 963-64.
187. Id. at 964 (holding grouping not appropriate in instant case).
188. See Sherman, 268 F.3d at 552-53 (Posner, J., dissenting) (describing re-
port's assessment that computer-simulated and actual child pornography pose
identical "threat" to child).
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would have to attempt to possess, receive, transport, distribute, or
ship actual child pornography, but fail by instead possessing, receiv-
ing, transporting, distributing, or shipping computer-simulated ma-
terial the defendant thought contained actual child
pornography.18 9  It seems that this would occur in limited
situations.
Although it appears that the dissent made a strong argument
that was never dealt with directly by the majority or any other cir-
cuit, the Supreme Court seemed to weaken this argument in the
recent decision of Ashcrofl v. Free Speech Coalition.19" In Free Speech
Coalition, the Court determined that the prohibitions of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2256(8) (B) and (D) were overbroad and unconstitutional.' i
Further, the Court rejected the government's contention that the
provisions of the statute should be upheld because computer-simu-
lated child pornography and pornography depicting adults made to
look like children incites illegal conduct.1 92 Therefore, Judge Pos-
ner's argument regarding the parallel concerns expressed by the
statute and by Congress is undermined by the Supreme Court's re-
cent decision. 193
VI. IMPACT
With the decision in Sherman, seven of eight circuits have sided
with the government to hold that the primary victims of possessing,
receiving, transporting, distributing, shipping, and reproducing
child pornography are the children depicted. 194 The only judicial
189. See Butler, 92 F.3d at 964 (noting attempts are treated identical to com-
pleted crimes).
190. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
191. See id. at 258 (describing how provisions restrict substantial amount of
permitted speech). For the full text of § 2256(8), including the unconstitutional
provisions, see supra note 150.
192. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 253 ("[M]ere tendency of speech to
encourage unlawful acts is not sufficient reason for banning it.").
193. For a discussion of the dissent's parallel concerns argument, see supra
notes 150-56 and accompanying text. Without resolving the primary victim issue,
the Supreme Court effectively distinguished actual child pornography from com-
puter-simulated child pornography and pornography involving adults made to
look like children. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 239-58.
194. See United States v. Sherman, 268 F.3d 539, 547 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding
child depicted as primary victim of possessing, receiving, and distributing child
pornography); United States v. Tillmon, 195 F.3d 640, 645 (11th Cir. 1999) (per
curiam) (finding that primary victim of transporting child pornography was child
portrayed); United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926, 930 (5th Cir. 1998) (determining
primary victim of receiving child pornography to be child portrayed); United
States v. Hibbler, 159 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1998) (ruling child portrayed as pri-
mary victim of possessing and distributing child pornography); United States v.
Boos, 127 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that primary victim of distribut-
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voices that deemed society in general as the primary victim were the
Fourth Circuit in Toler and Judge Posner's dissent in Sherman.' 95 In
light of this lopsided split to which Sherman contributed, the Toler
court's unique decision, holding society in general to be the pri-
mary victim, becomes even less persuasive. 196 The Fourth Circuit
was the first to weigh in on the issue and thus had no guidance
from the other circuits.197 Further, as previously noted, the Fourth
Circuit did not articulate its reasoning for holding the way that it
did. 198 Moreover, while no other circuits have addressed the issue
since Sherman, the Seventh Circuit has reaffirmed its holding in at
least one other decision. 199 As a result, this all bodes well for the
ing child pornography was child depicted); United States v. Ketcham, 80 F.3d 789,
793 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding child portrayed as primary victim of receiving, trans-
porting, distributing, and recording child pornography); United States v. Rugh,
968 F.2d 750, 756 (8th Cir. 1992) (determining primary victim of receiving child
pornography to be child depicted); United States v. Toler, 901 F.2d 399, 403 (4th
Cir. 1990) (holding that primary victim of transporting child pornography was so-
ciety in general).
195. For a discussion of the decision in Toler, see supra notes 50-57 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion ofJudge Posner's dissent in Sherman, see supra notes
145-60 and accompanying text.
196. See United States v. Walton, 255 F.3d 437, 443 (7th Cir. 2001) (declaring
compelling reasons needed to overturn circuit precedent).
197. See Sherman, 268 F.3d at 542 (noting Fourth Circuit as first to address
issue).
198. See Toler, 901 F.2d at 403 (relying on small portion of report to conclude
society in general to be primary victim); see also Anglin, supra note 48, at 1105
("[O]ne wishes the [Toler] court had explained more clearly the process by which
it reached .. . [its] conclusion."). Note that if the Fourth Circuit had concluded
the other way (that the child depicted was the primary victim), then Toler's counts
would have been grouped resulting in a lesser sentence. See Toler, 901 F.2d at 403.
Recall that in Toler, the defendant attempted to have one count of transportation
of a minor with the intent to engage in prohibited sexual conduct in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2423, grouped with one count of transporting child pornography in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A, and both involving the same victim, his twelve-year-
old stepdaughter. See id. The stepdaughter was arguably the primary victim of a
§ 2423 violation, but because the court found that the primary victim of the
§ 2252A violation was society in general, Toler's counts were not grouped. See id.
Given the desire to impose harsh sentences upon child pornographers, it is possi-
ble that the Fourth Circuit ruled the way it did to avoid grouping and sentenced
Toler within the thirty-seven to forty-six month guideline range, as opposed to the
thirty-three to forty-one month range. See id.
199. See United States v. Shutic, 274 F.3d 1123, 1126 (7th Cir. 2001) (indicat-
ing agreement "with the holding in Sherman that the primary victims in child por-
nography are the children depicted"). In Shutic, the defendant attempted to have
his two counts of transporting and shipping child pornography in interstate com-
merce via computer, in violation of § 2252A(a) (1), grouped as involving society in
general as the primary victim. See id. at 1124. In its decision, the court noted "[w]e
need not spend much time discussing Shutic's argument because we recently ad-
dressed precisely [this] issue . . . [in Sherman]." Id. at 1126.
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government's position that the children portrayed are the primary
victims of child pornography.21111
The dissent, however, did articulate three reasons for conclud-
ing that society in general should be the primary victim under 18
U.S.C. §§ 2252 and 2252A that the majority never directly ad-
dressed. 211 One of the arguments that the dissent made was not
very compelling.2112 A second argument was addressed directly by
the Ninth and Sixth Circuits.20 3 The dissent's other argument,
which seemed to make a valid point that was not addressed directly
by the majority in Shemnan or any other circuit, appears under-
mined by the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Free Speech Coali-
tion.204 As a result, the arguments for grouping are becoming slim
for child pornographers.
Elias Manos
200. See Walton, 255 F.3d at 443 (declaring compelling reasons needed to
overturn circuit precedent).
201. For a discussion of Judge Posner's dissent, see supra notes 145-60 and
accompanying text.
202. For a discussion of this argument, see supra notes 157-60 and accompany-
ing text.
203. For a discussion of this rationale addressed by the Ninth and Sixth Cir-
cuits, see supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
204. For a discussion of this rationale, see supra notes 150-56 and accompany-
ing text.
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